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Introduction
In social science debates over the nature of the Bangladeshi state 
and change of regime, as well as about the state of human rights, one 
tends to speak of distinct eras as if changes have been abrupt, albeit 
systemic in nature. One speaks of early democratic Bangladesh under 
its charismatic founding father, Sheik Mujib. One talks of a turn to 
authoritarian rule under mainly two generals (1975–1990) after the 
assassination of most of the Mujib family in their own home in the 
capital of Dhaka. Finally, one employs the expressions “a return to 
democracy” or “reinstatement of parliamentary democracy” after 1990. 
Too extravagant use of such terms, whose popular and scientific 
connotations overlap superficially, coexists uneasily with sparsely 
researched evidence of deep-seated continuity. In a similar fashion, 
international debates about trends in recognition/non-recognition and 
fulfillment of Indigenous rights and minority rights in the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts (CHT) are unclear, or even contradictory. One speaks of 
“before” and “after” the 1997 Peace Accord as if it were a watershed 
with profound political implications, while simultaneously being 
concerned with the continued militarization of the hill region and 
the selective implementation of the 1997 Accord. International and 
national human rights practitioners alike find progress not only 
painfully slow, but see reality as retrogressive.1 The leading human 
rights NGOs, national and international, turn every page to identify 
an approach that satisfies the most effective combination of measures 
and mechanisms that can facilitate, steer or exert pressure to achieve 
1. Tone Bleie, “Bangladesh’s challenges as elected member to the United Nations 
Human Rights Council,” in Solidarity 2006: Indigenous peoples have the right to 
territory: land and natural resources, (Dhaka, Bangladesh: Indigenous Peoples 
Forum, 2006), 28–29; CHTC, Press Release (January 15, 2015), http://www.
chtcommission.org/backend/product_picture/850doc.pdf
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substantive change. The framework that informs such international 
policy and advocacy efforts tends to treat civil-military relations 
and patrimonial leadership notions underlying cultural nationalist 
ideologies and constitutional culture, as context.
In contrast, coexisting with this Indigenous and minority rights-
based discourse of continued violations2 and lack of commitment to 
implement the Peace Accord,3 the “development camp” sees positive 
trends and narratives. They speak of Bangladesh’s impressive 
achievement in meeting several of the Millennium Development Goals4 
in disaster management, social and economic development, economic 
growth and increasing international recognition for contributions to 
international peacekeeping.5 Bangladesh’s enhanced international 
standing due to improvements in socioeconomic international rankings 
has boosted the legitimacy of the current Bangladesh Awami League-
led alliance government and its self-confidence. The government is 
getting tougher in setting its own terms, especially in the economic 
context of the past several years, with about 6% annual growth in GDP6 
providing stronger financial “muscle.” For example, this trend is most 
notably demonstrated in the government’s dealings with the World 
Bank as prospective lead funder of the Padma Bridge Project and the 
government’s readiness to fund this mega project after the World Bank 
pulled out in mid-2012 over allegations of grand corruption.7
2. The Minority Group International, “Mapping Bangladesh’s Political Crisis,” Asia 
Report no. 264, (Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2015). 
3. See the International Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission’s Press Statement of 
December 2014, calling for a roadmap with milestones for the Accord’s full 
implementation: http://www.chtcommission.org/backend/product_picture/770doc.pdf 
4. UNDP, “Millennium Development Goals: Bangladesh Progress Report 2015,” 
http://www.bd.undp.org/content/bangladesh/en/home/library/mdg/mdg-progress-
report-2015.html
5. Erik Jansen, ”På stille vei ut av fattigdommen,” Aftenposten Innsikt (2016): 54–55; 
Uz Rashed Zaman and Niloy Ranjan Biswas, “Bangladesh’s Participation in UN 
Peacekeeping Missions and Challenges for Civil-Military Relations: A Case for 
Concordance Theory.” International Peacekeeping 21, no. 3 (2014): 324–344. 
6. See http://www.tradingeconomics.com/bangladesh/gdp-growth, assessed January 
25, 2017. 
7. A.K. Wheeler, R.J. Aves and C.J. Tolley, “Detailed design of the Padma Multipurpose 
Bridge, Bangladesh—An Overview,” in IABSE_JSE Joint Conference on Advances 
in Bridge Engneering-2, Okui Amin and Bhuian eds. (Dkaha, Bangladesh: 
August 8–10, 2010), www.iabse-bd.org; “The World Bank Statement on Padma 
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This paper aims to stimulate a shift from an “issue” or “problem” 
approach in CHT-studies to a comprehensive interdisciplinary study of 
civil-military relations, characterized by power-sharing arrangements, 
a culture of patronage and factionalist behavior. CHT is commonly 
wedged between two dominant, rather incompatible narratives; one 
nationalist and security-oriented, the other normative—anchored in a 
liberal democracy model and human rights. The latter position has been 
articulated by, among others, the International Chittagong Hill Tracts 
Commission (CHTC), mostly informed by international law and political 
science, less so by political anthropology’s descriptive emic (insiders’ 
points of view) approaches of norms, institutions and practices.8 
Drawing on all these disciplines, this paper seeks to fill this gap, and 
to substantiate the paper’s main assumption: that alleged regime shifts 
should be substituted by an analytical emphasis of structural continuity, 
in order to better explain why the CHT Accord’s principal provisions 
remain largely unimplemented 20 years after the deal was signed, 
regardless of parties in executive power. In order to test the validity of 
this assertion, five main arguments will be sought substantiated. 
First, civil-military relations are intertwined—a conglomerate—and 
cemented by patrimonial vertical and horizontal bonds of patronage, 
non-transparent control over state resources and a power-sharing 
arrangement that makes the categories “civilian” and “military” fuzzy 
and overlapping. Second, this tacit power-sharing arrangement has 
three distinct phases: an early antagonistic one; a second experimental, 
increasingly institutionalized phase during military rule (with partly 
civilian elements) and reign; and third, the current phase of uneasy 
opportunistic co-existence, with (until recently) caretaker governments 
as a safety valve.9 Fourth, during times of military rule, the armed 
conflict in CHT became integral to this tacit national power-sharing 
Bridge,” The World Bank (June 29, 2012), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/
press-release/2012/06/29/world-bank-statement-padma-bridge
8. This author has been a member of the International CHT Commission since 2012. 
9. Ahmed Fakhruddin, The Caretakers: A First Hand Account of the Interim 
Government of Bangladesh (1990–1991), (Dhaka, Bangladesh: The University 
Press Limited, 1998); Nizam Ahmed, “Party Politics under a non-party caretaker 
government in Bangladesh: the Fakhruddin interregnum (2007–2009),” in 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 48, no. 1 (2010): 23–47. 
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structure, a civil-military complex not only in its own right, but one 
of the Bangladeshi state’s bearing pillars.10 A final argument is that 
the sources of reproduction of a political culture of oral rhetoric 
(agitational in nature), patronage and factionalism need to be fully 
appreciated in order to explain striking structural continuity across 
institutions (political parties, military and bureaucracy). 
Furthermore, a deeper understanding of such societal and system-
wide deeply culturally coded behavioral patterns renders it possible to 
predict and develop approaches that may engender structural change 
and a new scope for national and international actors to facilitate, steer 
or help augment positive societal change. 
I. Independence, contending ethno-nationalisms and  
the civil-military complex 
a) Bengali ethno-nationalism and statehood trauma
In the nine-month long West-Pakistan–East-Pakistan war that led to 
Bangladesh’s Independence in late 1971, it was not only West Pakistanis 
that were fighting East Pakistanis. Bengalis fought each other as whole 
regiments defected from the Pakistani army to fight side by side with 
civilians as Mukti Bahini or freedom fighters. The Islamist party Jamaat-
e-Islami and the Islamic fronts Al-Shams and Al-Badr (better known as 
the dreaded Razakars) actively supported the Pakistani military.11 The 
excessive brutality of the West Pakistani-led military crackdown by a 
well-equipped military, with weapons partly acquired as US military 
aid, execution-style mass murders and rape as weapons of war, would 
10. The term civil-military complex has certain similarities with the military-industrial 
complex, a term originally coined by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1961, a 
civilian elected president and former top military official. The constellation of 
forces in America that Eisenhower sought to define throughout his terms in office 
was the collusion between the arms industry, the military services and the political 
leadership. Since a domestic arms industry is not a main defining feature in this 
case, the term civil–military complex is applied instead. What the two constructs 
share is an analytical foci on the intricate and many-stranded connections between 
armed forces (engaged in commercial ventures) and the political leadership. In 
this case, a string of interconnected national and regional institutions (in CHT) and 
state-owned enterprises have commercial interests in the CHT. 
11. Sirajul Islam, ed. Banglapedia: National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh (Second 
Edition). 10 Vol., (Dhaka, Bangladesh: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 2003). 
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have quelled the East Pakistani uprising had not India intervened. 
During its final weeks, the war morphed into a regional conflict. Much 
of the country was a denuded low delta, and therefore ill-suited to Mao-
style guerilla warfare across the country for a protracted period, except 
for the Chittagong Hill Tracts and the country’s eastern and northern 
hill regions. The bloody, momentous war ended as well over 90,000 
Pakistani troops surrendered to the Indian army in the capital Dhaka. 
The responses of the several dozen Adivasi nationalities of the hills 
and plains and their actual involvement on either side of the conflict 
varied. Most notably, the 50th Chakma Raja Tridiv Roy (1933–2012), 
who had been elected from his constituency as an independent member of 
the provincial Parliament in 1970, sided with the West Pakistani forces. 
Following the surrender, he abdicated in favor of his son Devashish 
Roy (b.1959)12 and chose to remain a Pakistani citizen, pursuing a 
distinguished diplomatic and political carrier. The first-generation 
Bangladeshi narratives of the Liberation War depicted the 50th Raja as 
a traitor and war criminal due to his political positions during and after 
the war. Raja Tridi’s and some of his subjects’ siding with Pakistan 
made it easy for Bengali nationalists to incriminate the demand that 
CHT should regain its status as a special administrative area (under the 
CHT 1900 Regulation) and to brand the budding Santi Bahini guerilla 
movement as a successor movement. After the war ended, the Mujib 
government used its new security force (see discussion below) to kill 
in discriminatively alleged Pakistani collaborators.13 The brutality of 
the Bangladesh army and Indo-Tibetan Border Police Special Forces 
created resentment and a strong impetus for locals to arm themselves in 
self-defense. Less well known is the involvement of the Mizo (an ethnic 
group of CHT and Lusai Hills)14 under the protection of the Pakistani 
12. Devashish Roy, the current Raja of the Chakma Circle, is also a prominent lawyer. 
Roy is a political entrepreneur that mobilizes and mediates local, regional and 
international sources of legitimacy. his elected membership in the UN’s Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues and his appointment as Special Assistant with the rank 
of State Minister to the Caretaker Government (2007–2008) are manifestations of 
his successful career. 
13. K. Montu, “Tribal Insurgency in Chittagong Hill Tracts,” Economic and Political 
Weekly 15, no. 36 (September 6, 1981).
14. Willem Van Schendel, “A War Within a War: Mizo rebels and the Bangladesh 
liberation struggle,” Modern Asia Studies 50 (2015): 1; “Genocide in the Chittagong 
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Army and Tripura National Volunteers in the war’s latter phase and a 
special deal Dhaka and Delhi made in order to prevent Mizo militants 
from retaining a sanctuary in CHT.15. Other nationalities of the plains 
either actively supported the independence movement or fled for their 
lives across the border to safety in India, along with vast numbers of 
largely hindu Bengalis. The Pakistani forces dealt with hindus with 
even greater brutality than with their own brethren-in-faith. 
The first Constitution promulgated in 1972 enshrined principles of 
nationalism, socialism, democracy, and secularism. The army was not 
systematically purged for pro-Pakistani and Islamist supporters. Some 
collaborators were tried, yet many alleged war criminals went into 
exile in Pakistan and the United Kingdom. Given the massive scale 
of the atrocities committed by the army and the sudden absence of an 
external enemy, the new Mujib-led government signed a 25-year Treaty 
of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with India. The new leadership 
thought it inconceivable to start courting and modernizing an army 
in tatters. Sheikh Mujib had himself endured more than a decade of 
imprisonment and mistreatment in Pakistani jails. Naturally, he came 
to hate the army. The new civilian government chose instead to create 
a domestic security force (Rakhi Bahini). The 25,000-strong modern-
equipped force (a portion of them handpicked old Mukhti Bahini 
fighters), had to swear allegiance to Sheikh Mujib as incarnated supreme 
leader, rather than to the new motherland Bangladeshi in abstract. The 
paramilitary force was granted more or less free reign to harass and 
even murder troublesome members of the opposition. The new security 
policy and reform downsized the regular army but expanded the new 
and better-equipped high profile force. This alienated further sections 
of the army that became largely relegated to ceremonial and policing 
functions. This new Indo-Bangladeshi foreign policy, accompanied 
with this selective demilitarization and remilitarization (Rakhi Bahini 
Hill tracts Bangladesh: IWGIA Document 51,” Wolfgang Mey ed. (Copenhagen, 
Denmark: IWGIA, 1984). 
15. The deal allowed India (after the 1971 war) to retain ground-forces, supported with 
Indian Air-Force (Mi-4) teams in Ruma, Thanchi, Mowdok and Bolipara (CHT) 
until a fatal chopper accident in Noakali on August 14, 1975. The fatal crash made 
deadlines only a day before the assassination of Sheikh Mujib. The coup makers 
quickly terminated this secret and overtly sensitive deal. 
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functioned in reality as stormtroopers), nurtured a dangerous sense of 
grievance among a neglected and humiliated military officer corps. 
Sheikh Mujib Rahman’s popularity started waning already in his 
second and third years in office. Elaborating in detail these reasons 
is beyond the scope of this chapter. To sum up shortly, however, a 
few notable reasons for the growing internal opposition to his civilian 
government16 were his removal of democratic checks and balances and 
denial of a platform for the political opposition under lofty rhetoric of 
saving nationalism, democracy, secularism, and socialism—through 
a “Second Revolution.”17 Opposition from the discredited Muslim 
League and the outlawed Jamaat-e-Islami and its military wings 
was but one force Mujib obviously disdained. Pro-Maoist and pro-
Soviet communist parties (Communist Party of Bangladesh and 
National Awami Party) that had sided with Awami League (AL) under 
the resistance movement, saw the AL as bourgeois. In fact, Maoist 
guerillas fought both the Pakistani Army and the Mukti Bahini from 
border posts. The guerillas did not surrender arms after the brutal war, 
and continued intermittently to assassinate AL party members whom 
they defined as bourgeois enemies. Another contending force was 
Pakistani fighters who, alongside Bengali and Bihari collaborators, 
hid in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and were suspected of collaborating 
with local militants from some of the hill Tribes. 
Several coups were contemplated and planned in this early transition 
phase within the neglected, fractional yet politically conscious and 
divided officer corps. Some were carefully masterminded. Sheikh 
Mujib contributed to the factionalist tendencies by arbitrary promotions 
and perks.18 One “majors’ coup” was finally carried out on August 
16. As president, brilliant speaker, demagogue and patron of adoring party members 
and citizens, Sheikh Mujib amended the Constitution to permit the build-up of 
a one-party apparatus that merged political and administrative functions in a 
multi-tiered committee apparatus. Only the Kingpin/Chairman could nominate 
candidates for future elections. The so-called BKSAL-system came into force 
in 1975, shortly before Mujib and his family were murdered. An almost unified 
press uncritically endorsed the “Second Revolution” though it effectively meant 
the closure of the country’s budding press freedom; see Anthony Mascarenhas, 
“Bangladesh: A Legacy of Blood,” (London: hodder and Stoughton, 1986), 59.
17. From the 01.02.1975 edition of Bangladesh Today. 
18. Mascarenhas, supra note 16, at 34. 
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15, 1975. A group of junior officers managed to assassinate Sheikh 
Mujib, the nation’s founding father (Bangabhandu), and 20 of his 
close and extended family. Some were murdered in order to prevent 
dynastic succession to both civilian and military top positions.19 In 
the turbulent transition, the killers were pardoned, while sycophantic 
courtiers (earlier supporters of Mujib), including corrupt civil servants 
and executives, rallied behind the interim civil and military leadership 
in a cynical struggle for new positions, contracts, and favors.20 
Following the short-lived interim civilian-military government, 
a proxy-like government emerged under Bangladesh’s first military 
ruler, Major General Ziaur (Zia) Rahman (1976–81). Zia was a former 
Pakistani intelligence officer. A later noted and decorated freedom 
fighter, he as most freedom fighters advanced quickly to senior 
positions after the Independence War.21 For cynical tactical reasons, Zia 
resigned briefly from his top post during the tumultuous counter-coup 
days in early November 1975. he subsequently regained power aided 
by an instigated mutiny among the rank and file jawans (soldiers). 
One of Zia’s early achievements as first Deputy Chief Marital Law 
Administrator was to quell the mutiny. he used a mix of concessions, 
mass imprisonment, and courts-martial of the principal coup leaders. 
They were hanged or imprisoned after farcical judicial proceedings. 
The end of the mutiny did not bring an end to internal factionalism 
and attempted coups. A sizable number of soldiers reintegrated into 
the army had earlier defected and joined the freedom fighters. The 
soldiers’ exposure to the warfare of operating in mobile small units, and 
predominantly young age, made it rather difficult for them to readjust 
within a conventional army structure. Their reputations and identities 
as freedom fighters and their disdain, or even hatred, for traitors who 
19. Sheikh Mujib planned to groom his second son as new Chief of Staff and sent him 
for that purpose to the yugoslav Military Academy and then to Britain’s premier 
military academy Sandhurst; Mascarenhas, supra note 16, at 35.
20. Mascarenhas, supra note 16, at 79–92. 
21. In October 1973, Sheikh Mujib’s government granted two years of antedate 
seniority to all freedom fighters. This was not only done out of recognition of their 
service, but in order to stimulate mobility and recruitment as the army had many 
vacancies; the author would like to acknowledge this information from (Retired) 
Major General Syed Muhammed Ibrahim, himself a freedom fighter. 
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remained (some were returnees from West-Pakistan) within their ranks, 
bolstered a segmented army structure wherein mid-level officers with 
variable wartime records had their own dedicated followers. 
Under Zia, the army’s political control and more generous budgets 
increased recruitment and could have been used to introduce merit-based 
promotional systems. This did not happen because the political class 
shared the deep-seated culture of patronage across the civil-military 
divide. As noted, the first head of state Sheikh Mujib had himself 
resorted to similar divide-and-rule tactics. In technical terms, there was 
a merger into one army, but its reputation in the collective consciousness 
could not be restored in the short run. Still, Zia managed to survive until 
1981, when he was eliminated by another group of younger officers. 
b)  Enemy projections, Muslim nationalism and army 
patronage 
Zia clung to power with his combination of rule and reign by 
proclamation until the general elections of 1979 (presidential elections 
had been held a year earlier). Zia cleverly chose to retain the position 
Chief-of-Army, while a new party, Bangladesh National Party (BNP), 
galvanized support among a range of different constituencies (Jamaat-
e-Islami was legalized) all of which shared a dislike of the AL’s 
brand of Bengali nationalism. Otherwise, these right- and left-wing 
oppositional forces nurtured anything from absolutely conditional to 
wholesale support for an alternative nationalist narrative, crafted over 
ideas of religious belonging and territorial sovereignty. In a carefully 
formulated constitutional amendment that passed in 1977, the country 
was defined as a “Muslim” state and its citizens as “Bangladeshis” 
instead of “Bengalees.” Whether the amendment should be considered 
a partial or fundamental breech of the former Constitution is a matter 
of debate. Certainly, secularism was removed in favor of a faith-based 
preamble: Bismilla-ar-rahman-ar-rahim—proclaiming “absolute 
trust and faith in the almighty Allah.” Socialism, a left-wing term, 
was redefined as economic and social justice, a neo-liberal term of 
which the influential World Bank could approve. Most of the other 
paragraphs and clauses were left untouched. 
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The amendment hit a popular nerve among the numerical majority 
who were staunch nationalists and practicing Muslims. The term 
Bangladeshi rather than Bengali should theoretically weaken the 
conflation of the Bengali language with the country as a territorial 
realm and open for some level of recognition of “other” faiths, as 
the Koran recognizes Jews and Christians as “Peoples of the Book.” 
Arguably, there are two crucial factors in assessing what at best were 
limited benefits to majority–minority relations and specifically to the 
Plain Adibasis and Pahari (hill) Peoples (the latter rallying under the 
occupational umbrella term Jumma).22 These two factors are BNP’s 
brand of nationalism and Bangladeshis’ shared civilizational outlook. 
First, by combining territory and religion, the BNP’s political ideology 
effectively mobilized the notion of national borders. AL’s competing 
ethno-nationalist position de-emphasized outer borders at the expense 
of a layered Bengali identity. The outer and relatively recent layer—the 
eastern lands of the vast Bengali-speaking nation—was rooted in the 
modern Bengali language movement. This movement transmuted in the 
1960s into a popular struggle for greater federal autonomy within the 
geographically divided Pakistan. The more encompassing and historically 
rooted trans-border regional identity of a greater Bengal constituted a 
riparian, once jungle-covered ancient multi-racial eco-region.23 This 
latter eco-regional construction was necessarily controversial in the 
ongoing political process of forging a definitional core as a new sovereign 
country whose external borders were the arbitrary result of a cynical 
colonial policy of divide-and-rule. AL’s brand of ethno-nationalism was 
22. For an informed account, see, for example, Willem van Schendel, “The invention 
of the “Jummas”: State formation and ethnicity in Southeastern Bangladesh,” in 
Indigenous Peoples of Asia, Benedict Kingsbury et al. eds. (Ann Arbor, Michigan: 
Association of Asian Studies, 1995): 121–144.
23. These modern nationalist narratives appropriated and conflated the nouns Bengali 
and Bengal, a latter territorial term of ancient origin (Bangal pronounced bango-
aal) dating at least back to a pre-Aryan era of Dravidian and Kolerian peoples. In 
other words, the ancestors of contemporary “tribal” Dravidian, Munda and Tibeto-
Burmese speaking peoples were the early dwellers and rulers of the ancient famed 
Bangal and should, based on archaeological and linguistic evidence, claim as much 
if not more ownership to its territorial referent than contemporary ethnic Bengalis. 
See Anwarul Karim, Water and Culture in Bangladesh: Past and Present (Dhaka, 
Bangladesh: Sanjoy Majumder, 2016), 35–50. 
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arguably somewhat more accommodative to other ancient formations of 
the new borderlands that had had their own distinct cross-border political 
legacies of clan formations, chiefdoms, kingdoms, and their own diku 
(anti-foreigner) and anti-colonialist mass movements.24 Nevertheless, 
this partly imagined ethno-nationalist narrative conflated Bengal and 
Bengalis as its defining core. This constellation relegated the historical 
and pre-historical legacies and narratives of several other descendants 
of the civilizational patchwork of ancient Bengal as “other” peoples. 
At a narrative level and literally, the Chakma, Tripura, and several 
other hill peoples, the Garo and Khasi, and the Munda and Dravidian-
speaking Plain Adivasis became situated in geographical peripheries, 
considered vulnerable borderlands to the east, north, and west of the 
new nation’s heartlands.25 This Bengali-Bengal nexus, enshrined in the 
first Constitution, was unsuccessfully challenged by MP Manabendra 
Narayan Larma in his four-point demands.26 The rejection led Parbatya 
Chattagrom Jana-Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) to resort to politics by extra-
parliamentary and armed means. 
A second reason why this wave of Bangladeshi nationalism from 
the late 1970s did little to further the recognition of minority faiths 
lies in the cultural undercurrent shared by all Bengalis regardless of 
nationalist outlook and party affiliation. The way the BNP, like AL 
supporters, view their civilizational history is from the point of view 
of the peasant. As rooted soil cultivators with a long legacy as private 
land proprietors, their ingrained view of peoples who mainly depend 
on forest resources, combined with shifting cultivation or permanent 
24. Sontosh Bikash Tripura, Blaming Jhum, Denying Jhumia: Challenges of Peoples 
Land Rights in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh: A case study of Chakma 
and Tripura, Master’s Thesis (Tromsø, Norway: University of Tromsø, 2008), 
http://munin.uit.no/handle/10037/1535; Tone Bleie, Tribal peoples, nationalism, 
and the human rights challenge: the Adivasis of Bangladesh (Dhaka, Bangladesh: 
University Press, 2005).
25. Bleie, supra note 24, at 147–168; Willem Van Schendel et al., The Chittagong Hill 
Tracts: Living in a Borderland (Dhaka, Bangladesh: University Press Limited, 
2001).
26. The four-point demands were: CHT should be declared an autonomous zone with 
its own legislative assembly within a federal structure; inclusion in the constitution 
of a statute like the 1900-Regulation; preservation of the offices of tribal chiefs, 
customs and laws; and prohibition of amendments that could allow settlements of 
Bengalis in CHT. 
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agriculture, is generally derogatory.27 Such hill and plain peoples, in 
spite of massive pressure, managed to some degree to maintain their 
own distinct collective legacies of management and land use. As 
“simple cultivators,” they have been considered naïve and exploitable. 
From a Bengali vantage point, peoples of such dispositions and 
customary practices are primitive or tribal lok (people). The BNP 
alliance’s inclusion of Islamist parties who throughout the 1980s had 
received a Wahhabi purist religious education in madrassas funded 
by Saudi-Arabian oil money simply served to entrench the hegemonic 
minority–majority construction even further. Both the Islamist parties 
and their well-endowed religious NGOs wanted to purge local Islam 
of its non-Islamic ancient syncretistic influences.28 
c)  War trauma, self-possession and closure of space for 
recognition 
After Independence, a torturous path of state building and hegemonic 
majority-led and defined nation-building got underway. One has to 
appreciate the weight of the colonial experiences with the division 
of Greater Bengal, the Muslim League’s lofty two-nation theory and 
an administrative setup that was a distinctly colonial legacy. The hill 
peoples had their own bitter experience of British overlords and the 
division of the Chittagong Hills between India, Pakistan, and Burma 
in 1947. The portion of the hills that came under the rule of the state 
of Pakistan received, during the 1950s, special administrative status as 
it came to local authority and political control by the state and taxation 
practice. The largely retained chiefly structures and the CHT 1900 
Manual were concessions of sorts. Into this cauldron of bitter—or at 
least mixed—colonial exposure, came a fresh collective war trauma 
that naturally gave way to an emotional, polarized debate structured 
27. Tone Bleie and Logen Kisku, Silent Forests: Culture, Environmental Degradation 
and Poverty among Santals of Bangladesh, Commissioned Report (Bergen, 
Norway: The Chr. Michelsen Institute, 1999); Bleie, supra 24, at 213–255.
28. Asim Roy, The Islamic Syncretistic Tradition in Bengal (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1983); Ali Riaz, Interaction of “transnational” and 
“local” Islam in Bangladesh, NIBR Report (Seattle, Washington: The National 
Bureau of Asia Research, April 2009). 
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around heroes and traitors. In this agitated atmosphere, the CHT 
leaders’ call for constitutional recognition was vehemently rejected. 
The parliamentary debate around the CHT demand mobilized not only 
the polarized liberation discourse of the war-affected Bengali political 
elite and common people, but also the extremely engaging historical 
narratives of British rule-and-divide policy. 
Within this context of emotionally charged narratives, the variable 
support of the hill Peoples for the liberation movement and the 
Chakma Raja’s primary standpoint in 194729 played into this heated 
discourse organized around partly factual, partly un-nuanced, partly 
unsubstantiated claims. The support of the hill leaders for arguments 
of administrative autonomy anchored in a “pacification-motivated” 
treaty and a compromise between the former colonial masters and 
the Chakma Raja was unhelpful. A highly politically conscious 
Bengali polity that was proud of its current and ancestral resistance 
to the Raj, could not be won over. That Santals, Oraons, Mundas, 
Chakmas, and several other hill peoples could rightfully claim their 
own early impressive legacies of mass resistance was a non-issue to 
the Bengali majority preoccupied with an exercise in exclusionist 
nation-building. That former army and intelligence personnel had 
established operations in a far-flung forested Hill region, apparently 
with some degree of local collaboration, reinforced an understanding 
of CHT as the country’s vulnerable underbelly. AL’s somewhat muted 
approach of non-prosecution of many war criminals did little to help 
mend society’s wounds. A poisonous climate of muted grievances, 
unmediated suffering, and suspicion prevailed. 
The refusal to grant Constitutional recognition, seen through 
the lens of rational political theory of accommodation, is difficult 
to comprehend. Indeed, the claims underlying the demands of 
Constitutional recognition, extensive regional autonomy,30 and 
recognition of cultural rights, are similar to the political causes and 
29. The Raja’s principle stance was that the whole CHT region should remain within 
India instead of being divided between the two nations in-waiting and colonial 
Burma. 
30. CHT’s painful division in 1947 can be compared to that of Greater Bengal. Bengal 
was first divided in 1905, a decision the British first revoked. A second division 
took place at Independence in 1947. 
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grievances that underpinned the movement for recognition of the 
Bengali language and greater regional autonomy. Arguably, the second 
Bengali renaissance as a brand of cultural nationalism was largely 
exclusionary and hegemonic. In the agitated atmosphere right after the 
war, it was almost impossible to counter and rationally challenge these 
narratives with evidence-based facts about the Plain Adibasis and hill 
peoples’ colonial and wartime resistance.31 Indeed, had their leaders 
attempted to publicly claim their rightful historical and pre-historical 
stakes in Bengal and the adjacent regions of Chota Nagpur, the Khasi 
and Garo Hills, and the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the public’s reaction 
might have turned explosive. The propagated variant of Muslim 
nationalism produced, if anything, a more virulent hegemonic form of 
nationalism than that of the AL. 
The emergence of new internal and external enemies was convenient 
for the army in legitimizing its dual role as national guardian and 
protector of state sovereignty by enforced border control. The militant 
revolutionary group led immediately after Independence by the 
legendary liberation hero Tiger Siddiqi (Abdul Kader Siddiqi) was 
protesting the killing of Bangabandhu. It was perhaps a minor security 
threat, but the outfit’s importance (however short lived32) could 
conveniently be exaggerated. By early 1976, the early skirmishes 
in the forest-clad CHT between guerrilla fighters and soldiers slid 
into regular low-intensity warfare, cleverly used in propaganda 
to defend a rapid military and police build-up and presence. The 
armed conflict was also used to justify a more pronounced role of 
the military in administration of CHT. At the divisional level, a high-
ranking army officer administered the insurgency prone districts. A 
31. These early-polarized narratives were conventionalized in first generation 
narratives. Second generation narratives, more nuanced and critical, are to 
some degree genuinely debated, but are also attempted at being discredited and 
marginalized by authoritarian means; see for example David Ludden, “The Politics 
of Independence in Bangladesh,” Economic and Political Weekly 46, no. 35 
(2011): 79–85; Naeem Mohaiemen, “Flying blind: Waiting for a Real Reckoning 
in 1971,” Economic and Political Weekly 46, no. 36 (2011): 40–52; Amrit Ranjan, 
“Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971: Narratives, Impacts and the Actors,” India 
Quarterly 72, no. 2 (2016): 132–145. 
32. Tiger Siddiqi’s group disappeared after a major confrontation with the Bangladesh 
Army and withdrawal of Indian support. 
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counter-insurgency, state-sponsored settler program, modeled on 
the approach used by the US army in Vietnam, got underway in the 
late 1970s. The program was backed by brutal punitive expeditions, 
land occupations, and stepped-up border patrols, the latter aimed at 
containing the guerrilla’s operations on Bangladeshi soil sometimes 
launched from safe bases on the Indian side.33 
After one unsuccessful attempt to start dialogue with PCJSS, the Zia 
regime scaled-up its operations.34 Quelling a “communist” rebellion 
could be counterproductive. Keeping the offensive running gave the 
army a solution to its search for an enemy it could conjure up as a threat 
to the motherland’s sovereignty. Armed disobedience violated the 
state’s monopoly of power. The demand for internal autonomy, based 
on the CHT 1900 Regulation, threatened the state authority’s right to 
fully dispose of the vast hill region’s valuable forests. The harnessing 
of inland water resources for development had been kick-started 
during the Pakistan period, and would continue. These perceived and 
deliberately magnified threats lent urgency to calls to strengthen the 
army, which grew from 17,000 in 1975 to 72,000 in 1981.35 Apart 
from the army and the border police, a paramilitary security force 
(Ansar) was deployed, and Bengali settlers were trained as Village 
Defense Parties. The vast influx in 1978 of Burmese Muslim refugees 
(currently called Rohingya) provided another rationale for militarizing 
the Bangladeshi–Burma border. 
33. Mey, supra note 14. Bangladesh had its own largely homegrown Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) process. First, Zia offered amnesty to 
defecting fighters. A full-fledged DDR effort occurred only later as part of the 
1997 Accord. For a general introduction to DDR, see: Tatjana Stankovic, Stina 
Torjesen and Tone Bleie, Fresh Insights on Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration: A Survey for Practitioners, (Kathmandu, Nepal: Success Foundation 
Pvbt. Ltd., 2010).
34. By chance, the guerrilla leader MN Larma’s younger brother JB Larma was arrested 
in Khagrachari town in 1976. Larma was persuaded (as a precondition for his 
otherwise unconditional release) by the then-Brigade Commander in Rangamati to 
carry a message from President Zia, who at this stage thought the uprising could 
possibly be quelled by economic development. Zia hoped to convince PCJSS to 
withdraw its ban on hill People contributing labor to projects under the newly 
formed CHT Development Board. PCJSS and SB’s leaders came to dismiss the offer. 
35. Choudhury M Shamim, “Civil-Military Relations and the Future of Democracy 
in Bangladesh,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 22, no. 2 (1994): 
351–366. 
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d) Checkered “civilian” leanings of the military and 
indirect uses of aid 
The Zia era (1975–1981) brought back the army as a core pillar 
of the fledging state. Army expansion and improved financial and 
social benefits (following the November 1975 Sepoy/Jawan uprising 
mentioned above) did little to stamp out internal factionalism, a 
persistent problem Zia sought to mitigate through a balancing power 
game and by purging the military of his opponents. In the end, Zia 
was assassinated in a coup in May 1981, just two years after his newly 
established Bangladesh Nationalist Party made a move toward electoral 
democracy in the 1979 parliamentary election. This step toward a multi-
party system provoked a counter-move within the ranks of the army. 
Lieutenant-General hussain Muhammad Ershad’s (1982–1990) 
coup did not simply eliminate Zia. Ershad disposed of the recently 
elected civilian president and stamped out a budding democratization. 
Bangladesh’s two major parties, the newcomer BNP and the established 
AL, were now led by two dynastic heirs, President Zia’s widow 
Begum Khaleda Zia and Sheikh hasina, Mujib’s surviving daughter. 
The former first lady’s husband was at least indirectly complicit in the 
assassination of the hasina family, including Sheikh hasina’s own 
and the country’s elevated father figure. As leaders, they embodied 
literally and symbolically a legacy of bloodshed and alternative 
nationalist narratives in which the liberation struggle and ultimate 
sacrifices figured prominently. They were bitter personal enemies who 
were nevertheless united to some degree in their struggle to “restore” 
democracy. That would take another decade, as the new military and 
political strongman was a seasoned player. 
Ershad founded the Jatio Party (JP). JP was a platform on which he 
managed to recruit rather liberally erstwhile AL and BNP members 
and so far unaffiliated army officers, civil servants, and business 
people. Under Ershad, an electoral local party organization was built. 
Muscle politics brutalized and militarized the country. handguns 
were lavishly handed out to local party cadres from the 1986 elections 
onwards, a development this author observed at close hand in North-
Western Bangladesh. The military’s footprint in CHT remained 
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heavy, in spite of international condemnation of new atrocities, as 
the international community had earlier condemned the Kalampati 
massacre in 1981 (and even earlier massacres) under the late General 
Zia. In spite of the media’s attention to the brutality of and violations 
by the army, Bangladesh retained its status as a high priority recipient 
of international aid. Donor pressure made the Ershad government 
make certain rather cosmetic concessions, including a sham election 
in 1986 in which the AL chose to participate, and an amnesty offer in 
1983 to “misguided” Santi Bahini.36 In late 1987 the government and 
PCJSS met officially in the jungle. The negotiations stranded mainly 
due to two demands in PCJSS’s charter; extensive provincial self-rule 
(interpreted by GoB37 as tantamount to sessionism) and removal of the 
by then sizable Bengali settler population. 
Foreign aid was a honey pot for rent-seeking behavior under 
Ershad’s military rule. This rule thrived on “swing door politics” 
not only between the parties, but between the military, the civilian 
bureaucracy, and a partly government-controlled economy dominated 
by large corporations. In the CHT, a considerable number of private 
leases of forestland (Unclassified State Forest) for commercial 
horticulture and rubber plantations were issued to civil and military 
officials, to politicians and their relatives, and to business partners.38 
During the counter-insurgency, a Special Settlement Zone was set up, 
based on confidential circulars and hurried land acquisition procedures 
that disregarded legal land rights and land settlement practices.39 
During Ershad’s rule and reign, a massive influx of development 
assistance made rapid expansion of the military budget possible. 
From 1981/82 to 1989/90, the army grew from 77,000 to 103,000 
and was modernized by aid from China (equipment) and US (training 
and education in military academies in the US). In the latter half of 
the 1980s, the mass-supported student wings of the opposition parties 
managed to unite sufficiently and long enough to force Ershad to 
36. Mey, supra note 14, at 169. 
37. The author would like to acknowledge (Retired) Major General Syed Muhammad 
Ibrahim for this information. Ibrahim was party to the GoB’s negotiation team. 
38. Shapnan Adnan and Ranajit Dastadiar, Alienation of the Lands of Indigenous Peoples 
in CHTs of Bangladesh, (Dhaka, Bangladesh: CHTC and IWGIA, 2011): xxv.
39. Ibid., xii. 
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resign in favor of a transition/interregnum mechanism, the so-called 
“caretaker government.” 
e)  Electoral democracy and power-sharing arrangements 
The military-formed BNP, led by Begum Khaleda Zia, won the first 
free parliamentary election in February 1991.40 The higher echelons of 
the army refrained from intervening this time. It was an early transition 
to an electoral democracy and a notable shift in civilian–military 
relations. Analysts have characterized it as a shift to an apolitical 
military willing to accept civilian rule. Nevertheless, it is essential 
to comprehend the nature of this uneasy power-sharing arrangement, 
in which caretaker governments were a key element, and why it has 
remained largely acceptable to both the major political parties and the 
military for the last twenty-five years or so.
This argument builds on several key factors. First, one needs to 
recognize that the timing of the transition to civilian rule coincided with 
the end of the Cold War. A number of dictatorships in Latin America, 
Africa, and Asia were either giving a greater role to genuine political 
parties and civil society actors in government, or democratic forces 
had replaced former autocratic regimes altogether. The higher tiers of 
the army and its close allies within the civil bureaucracy and business 
sector realized they needed to give way to the mounting demands for a 
democratic transition from the international aid community and its own 
vibrantly youth-dominated political population. The army and its close 
allies were seasoned players in supporting each other in establishing 
and running profitable business ventures that also benefited from 
the massive inflow of international assistance. Another boon for the 
army was the new BNP-led government’s (1991–1996) lack of full 
commitment to ending the low-intensity war against the internal 
enemy PCJSS and its armed wing Santi Bahini in the Chittagong 
hill Tracts. The army could retain and even expand its military and 
commercial interests in CHT. The clever dispensation arrangement 
with a CHT ministry directly under the prime minister’s office was 
40. Craig Baxter. “Bangladesh in 1991: A Parliamentary System,” Asian Survey 31, no. 
2 (1992), 164–65. 
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retained. Arguably, in this first transition to an elective democracy, the 
CHT civil-military complex, started during Zia’s rule, was allowed to 
mature and institutionalize further during BNP’s two periods in power. 
As argued above, the Khaleda Zia and Sheikh hasina-led parties 
joined forces to have civilian rule “restored.” The victory of the 
democratic forces led to an intermediary period of “normal,” somewhat 
functional, parliamentary democracy. however, this early process 
of genuine democratic consolidation was reversed when old bitter 
animosities and dynastic rivalries became all too evident, leading to 
AL’s boycott of the 1996 election. Giving in to mounting pressure from 
street mass politics, the ruling party supported the 13th Constitutional 
Amendment, which allowed for another caretaker government to 
take over. Parliament was dissolved during the voting period. This 
move brought the AL back into executive power for the first time 
since 1975. The election manifesto contained a promise to end the 
military conflict in CHT through a negotiated truce. This electoral 
promise was fulfilled in December 1997, anchored in the signed CHT 
Accord with its provisions for surrender, disarmament, demobilization 
and reintegration of the Santi Bahini, repatriation of refugees from 
India and rehabilitation of internally-displaced persons (IDPs). In 
addition to these rather short-term, doable provisions, the Accord also 
contained important long-term provisions such as securing IPs’ land 
rights, cancellation of illegal leases to non-residents, establishment 
of a Land Commission to resolve the latter disputes, and measures to 
install a civilian administration through Hill District Councils.41 The 
AL-led government that had fronted the Accord from the government 
of Bangladesh put the most consequential provisions on the backburner 
while paying lip service to their election pledges. BNP (in opposition) 
reacted by mass agitation to the signed Accord. 
41. “Chittagong Hill Tracts Treaty 1997,” Government of Bangladesh and PCJSS, 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B8ka4FwgZxAManF6cjhWczgxZ1U/edit; 
Shapan Adnan, Migration, Land Alienation and Ethnic Conflict: Causes of Poverty 
in the CHTs of Bangladesh (Dhaka, Bangladesh: Research and Advisory Services, 
2004); Md. Zahed hassan, Institutional Responsiveness to Indigenous Rights: The 
case of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Land Dispute Resolution Commission, Master’s 
Thesis (Tromsø, Norway: University of Tromsø, 2011). 
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A toxic mix of mutual distrust prevailed between the top dynastic 
leaders and a winner-takes-all mentality in terms of turfs, control 
of offices, institutions and territory. Dynastic wrangling, patronage, 
and factionalism made national politics excessively confrontational 
with mass-based street politics, both violent and non-violent. 
Another caretaker government was brought in to oversee the 2001 
election, which brought the BNP back into power (2001–2006) 
in an alliance with the Jamaat-i-Islam and two other fringe parties. 
Their commitment to the implementation of the Peace Accord was 
at best lukewarm. Polarization and violent mass politics intensified 
prior to the 2006 election, leading to its postponement. The level and 
seriousness of political violence, nationwide strikes, the rise of Islamist 
militant groups, and massive economic losses, resulted in a military 
intervention on 11 January, 2007. A state of emergency was declared. 
A military-supported caretaker government ran the country until late 
2008. The military’s multiple roles as political intervener (rationalized 
as chief guardian of national security) and caretaker government 
installer rather than backstage facilitator, was in the beginning taken 
quite positively by sections of the electorate, civil society, and the 
international donor community. The government’s honeymoon did not 
last long, due to mass arrests and prosecution of the two top female 
leaders. Among the most serious charges were grand corruption and 
conspiracy to murder opponents. Even initially popular measures to 
promote in-party democracy, the so-called “Two-Minus-Strategy,” 
floundered. What was less noticed and opposed by the highly 
political polity was the military’s expansion of its counter-insurgency 
operation in CHT.42 Notably, this occurred while the Chakma Raja 
and Circle Chief was Special Assistant to the caretaker government 
and in charge of the CHT Ministry, which is a telling testimony to the 
limits of civilian control over the military. Most of the undoubtedly 
incriminated top political leadership returned to the national scene, 
resorting to their old, mutually devastating rhetoric. The government’s 
differential treatment of Sheikh Hasina and Begum Khaleda and their 
closest relations, made it so the BNP claimed that the military favored 
an AL victory. Indeed, the AL-headed alliance won an overwhelming 
42. Adnan, supra note 41. 
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two-thirds majority, a result BNP took as strong evidence of vote 
rigging. The party’s response was to boycott the 2014 election. 
The window of opportunity provided by two terms of AL rule to 
deepen and consolidate democracy was squandered for a number 
of reasons. The June 2011 abolition of the caretaker system by the 
Supreme Court sanctioned by the 15th Amendment to the Constitution 
and the failure to introduce electoral reform, constitute perhaps the 
most visible and nationally polarizing policies, indicating a stronger 
will to rule by a “winner-takes-all” strategy among the top AL 
leadership displaying a distinctly authoritarian leadership legacy, rather 
akin to BNP’s top leadership. It is in this wider political context the 
controversial amendment of the clause on ethnic minorities should be 
analyzed. This context includes the frustratingly (from a government 
point of view) internationally well connected Indigenous rights NGOs 
and the civil-military nexus with its power-sharing compulsions. 
Attempts have been made to contain these civil society voices. Branded 
as foreign agents, they have been spied on, intimidated, assaulted 
physically and denied access to CHT for alleged security reasons. 
The power-sharing compulsions also necessitate non-implementation 
of several important provisions of the CHT Accord. Perhaps needless 
to note, this is contrary to the lofty rhetoric of the AL government. 
Indeed, the influx of new settlers and illegal occupation and sale of 
Pahari (Hill) lands continued unabated, while no credible effort was 
made to rehabilitate earlier illegal settlers outside CHT.43 Clearly, 
there is a modus operandi where the civil-military complex, operating 
through a number of tacit power-sharing arrangements, has rendered 
redundant public accountability for electoral promises to implement 
the Accord. This Accord, if fully implemented, would probably have 
to some degree demilitarized the hill region.44 The situation amounts 
43. Rajkumari Chandra Kalindi Roy, Land rights of the indigenous Peoples of the 
CHTs, Bangladesh, (Copenhagen, Denmark: IWGIA Documents No. 99, 2000); 
Raja Devashish Roy, Land and Forest Rights in the CHT, Bangladesh, (Kathmandu, 
Nepal: ICIMOD, 2002); Shapan Adnan, Situation of Minorities of the CHTs under 
the Caretaker Government and their Participation in the Upcoming Elections, 
Written Testimony submitted to USCIRF, Capitol Hill, Washington, D.C. (2008).
44. Full takeover by the civilian administration and reduced army presence is of course 
no guarantee for any immediate dramatic drop in armed violence due to arms 
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to nothing less than the execution of a “shock doctrine” involving cuts 
in the number of army battalions and reduced paramilitary presence, 
immediate action such as the massive reshuffling of personnel to other 
cantonments throughout the country, and a likely downsizing of the 
army over the longer term. Army personnel posted in CHT would be 
deprived of several illegal lucrative rent-seeking incomes, not to speak 
of handsome direct income from commercial ventures based on illegally 
acquired land. Vast numbers of Bengali settlers would face a reduced 
security guarantee and real prospects of having to return land de-facto 
controlled through land occupation or based on forged documents. A 
broad conglomerate of politicians (including retired army and police 
officers), bureaucrats, business corporations (to some degree owned by 
military persons), corrupt local leaders, and, not to forget, current army 
and police personnel, would all see their vested commercial interests 
and important sources of livelihoods threatened, or even lost. 
The AL-led alliance could afford to ignore its Accord pledges, but 
not its pledge to try war criminals from the time of the Independence 
war. The trials led to mass violence orchestrated mainly by Jamaat 
activists, including attacks on police and security personnel after the 
verdicts started being announced from early 2013. A new antagonistic 
front of confrontational street politics opened, with youths led by 
moderate and secular activists rallying under the banner of the 
Shahabag Movement. Targeted street killings of advocates for a secular 
stance and for rights for sexual minorities followed. The government 
and courts responded by a High Court Judgment cancelling Jamaat’s 
registration with the Election Commission. BNP-led parties boycotted 
the last election of January 2014. It became the most violent in the 
country’s 45-year election history. The evidence of vote rigging and 
party-led organized violence is considerable. The armed police and 
the paramilitary Rapid Action Battalion met this street violence with 
excessively brutal counter measures. 
The above account unravels key underlying facets of nation- and 
state-building, organized around a timeline from the early period 
of AL rule (1972–1975), through two periods of military rule with 
controlled by Bengali setters, CHT-based factions opposed to the Accord, and the 
presence of armed proxy actors. 
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certain civil leanings (1975–1990), ending with electoral democracy 
(1991–present). In this section, deep-seated continuities and changes 
in “the deep state” and in competing nationalist narratives have 
been identified which may help explain the status quo and also the 
space available to national and international NGOs and multilateral 
partners in negotiations with governing institutions embedded in a 
civil-military complex. Civil-military relations offer a neglected but 
valuable approach to tease out some important and inadequately 
understood culturally coded institutional behaviors and institutional 
dynamics, inexplicable by mainstream political theory of the pillars 
of the state, of civil-military relations, democratization, international 
law and good governance. 
II. Civil-military relations—towards a grounded 
understanding
a) Limitations of classical civil-military theories
For more than a generation, theories of civil-military relations have 
been dominated by a normative theory of civil-military relations in 
“mature” democracies. Scholars have struggled to apply these theories 
to explain a variety of empirical cases for the global South and North 
demonstrating civil-military constellations characterized by blurred 
spheres. One has naturally struggled to think anew about how such 
enmeshments or conglomerates actually mold and stymie democracy, 
trample on peoples’ sovereignty at the expense of state sovereignty, 
and undermine a state’s human rights obligations. 
The classical theories of respectively Samuel P. huntington and 
Morris Janowitz address civilian objective political control over 
the military (in order to protect liberties and rights of individual 
citizens) and a civic republican theory.45 Janowitz’s theory downplays 
huntington’s liberal argument of the state as protector of individual 
rights. he instead emphasizes citizen participation in defending the 
45. Samuel P. huntington, Samuel, The Soldier and the State. The Theory and Politics 
of Civil-Military Relations, (Cambridge, United States of America: Belcap Press 
of harvard University, 1957); Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social 
and Political Portrait, (New york: The Free Press, 1960). 
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state or the nation. Janowitz’s republican theory renders the ideal of 
the citizen-soldier critical to foster civil participation. Without going 
into detail in this article, the posited distinction between political and 
military spheres is highly problematic, even in the US with its civil-
military and civil-intelligence complexes. huntington’s theory does not 
explain how the citizen-soldier tradition can be sustained when there is 
no objective need for mass mobilization. Unlike huntington, Janowitz 
at least acknowledges that the two spheres might be blurred, causing 
tensions. his insight largely remains at the empirical level. Another 
serious problem with relying on these classical theorists is that they, 
for rather obvious reasons, do not adequately address transnational 
civil-military relations as a result of regional defense organizations 
such as NATO (“out of area” operations), African Union forces (“in 
the area” operations), and intentional peace-keeping operations under 
the aegis of the UN or regional organizations.
This contextual remark about the legacy of this field of inquiry, 
and the (too) enduring influence of these theories, in spite of 
shortcomings, does not invalidate civil-military relations as a useful 
field for our purposes of understanding a largely homegrown civil-
military nexus. In the following section, a number of synthesizing 
arguments based on the above inquiry of Bangladesh’s Byzantine, 
conglomeratic civil-military complex will be outlined. Then the fraught 
constellation of transactional and national civil-military relations 
and democratic values, resulting from Bangladesh’s peacekeeping 
role, will be analyzed. No scholarly agreement exists as to whether 
the peacekeeping engagement generally promotes democratization 
or rather subsidizes continued militarization of the CHT.46 The two 
Bangladeshi international relations scholars Rashed U. Zaman and 
Niloy R. Biswas have argued that concordance theory which (building 
46. “Militarization in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh: The slow demise of the 
region’s indigenous peoples,” IWGIA Report 14 (Copenhagen, Denmark: IWGIA, 
2012); Rashed Uz Zaman and Niloy R. Biswas, “Bangladesh’s Participation in 
UN Peacekeeping Missions and Challenges for Civil-Military Relations: A Case 
for Concordance Study,” International Peacekeeping 21, no. 3 (2014): 324–
344; Motiar Rahman, “Blue Berets in the UN Peacekeeping Process: The case 
of Bangladesh Police,” Indian Journal of Politics 14, no. 1 (2009): 36; Kabilan 
Krishnasamy, “Bangladesh and UN Peacekeeping: Participation of a ‘Small’ 
State,” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 41, no. 1 (2003): 32–33. 
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on Janowitz’s empirical insights) emphasizes that accommodation and 
shared values between the military, the political elites and polity is 
better suited to explain civil-military relations in Bangladesh. Not 
least, the peace operation’s importance may be better explained by the 
conditions that decide domestic military intervention and agreement 
between the military, political elites and the polity. 
b)  The rise of a homegrown civil-military complex 
Statehood in Bangladesh resulted from a ruthless military clampdown 
on a regional autonomy movement with ethno-nationalistic overtones.47 
This bloodstained and traumatic “birth” is in direct and indirect ways 
at the center of meta-narratives about the origin of the state and “the 
nation” as an imagined community of belonging. The sovereign 
post-Raj Pakistani state paradoxically acted as its colonial master, 
underestimating the long political legacies of mass action and agency 
of the peoples of East Pakistan as citizens. Pakistan’s dictatorship set 
the terms for civil-military relations in East Pakistan and its policy 
shifts in CHT before and after the Kaptai Dam debacle.48 The Pakistani 
army’s eastern wing, built on the pioneering First and Second East 
Bengal Regiments, was staffed with Bengalis.49 When the Pakistan 
Armed Forces, in March 1971, cracked down on the civilian movement 
and military personnel opposing mass executions, the East Bengal 
47. Willem Van Schendel, A History of Bangladesh (Cambridge-New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009); Sarmilla Bose, Dead Reckoning: Memories of the 1971 
Bangladesh War (Chichester, United Kingdom: Columbia University Press, 2011); 
“History, Culture and Politics,” The Bangladesh Reader, Meghna Guhathakurta and 
Willem Van Schendel eds. (Durham, United States of America: Duke University 
Press, 2013).
48. The Government of Pakistan chose a softer approach to transition in the 1950s, 
retaining the hierarchy of semi-traditional office holders and accepting the CHT 
1900 Regulation. This accommodation strategy, through a degree of indirect rule 
(controversial among the Chakma), was sacrificed for the Kaptai Dam Project. 
This was an interventionist prestige project that resulted in mass displacement of 
the Indigenous Peoples. Pakistan’s powerful leader must have wanted to match 
the Indian government’s socialist policy of mega-hydro projects. The CHT 1900 
Regulation was also abolished. 
49. Stephen Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Berkley, California: University of California 
Press, 1984).
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Regiment had eight battalions. The revolt of the Bengali personnel 
prompted the decision of the exiled interim government in June 1971 
to deploy forces in guerrilla warfare alongside civilians. Mukti Bahini 
mobilized a combination of citizen-soldier ideals in protection of the 
motherland and civilians’ ideals of the necessity of disobedience. That 
included armed action for freedom through secessionism. 
Framed within an exclusionist ethno-nationalist ideology, the first 
generation war narrative only glorified Bengali freedom fighters. 
This narrative rendered invisible fighters and civilians from other 
ethnic plains and hills groups who had valiantly resisted and saved 
lives.50 The Chakma Raja’s “unpatriotic” act, siding with Pakistan and 
paramilitary fighters’ operations in CHT, fortified the official national 
understanding of freedom as exclusively fought and won by Bengalis. 
The war trauma magnified this sense of betrayal, closing off any 
negotiation space for MP Larma’s four-point demands in 1972. Until 
his sudden violent death, Sheikh Mujib’s attitude to the demands of the 
hill leaders remained unbendable and dismissive. 
Immediately after Liberation in 1971, civil-military relations were 
largely antagonistic. The AL regime’s security reform deliberately 
wing-clipped the army and established Rakkhi Bahini as a parallel 
force, operating as the charismatic and patrimonial Sheikh Mujiib’s 
stormtroopers. To the officers and the rank and file soldiers who 
remained inside the highly fractured politicized army, the reform was 
a major affront. A potent mix of grievances and patriotism, however 
misguided, motivated coup plans. 
The liberation hero Zia Rahman, a career officer, joined coup 
makers and later abolished the Rakkhi Bahini. he chose patronage for 
the armed forces. The latter did not rise like a phoenix from the ashes 
of the war, but rather retained basic formal features modeled on the 
Pakistani/British military bureaucratic model. The forces’ offensive 
three-brigade structure had already been altered in connection with 
Mujib’s security reform. Zia wanted an army structure similar to that of 
other Commonwealth nations. As a military response to the early CHT 
50. This exclusionist stance is officially carried forward to this day. Bangladesh Army’s 
official list of freedom fighters contains only Bengalis. See the official website: 
https://www.army.mil.bd/List_Of_FreedomFighter 
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insurgency, Zia and his top ranking officers adopted the US Army’s 
anti-communist counter insurgency doctrine, combat tactics, and 
training approach, largely overlooking the uprising’s complex political, 
economic, social and cultural antecedents in Pakistani (1947–1971) 
and British (1860–1947) rule. The Counterinsurgency Doctrine’s 
blatant failure in Vietnam did not hinder its use on a radicalized hill 
population with its own ancient martial traditions. As initially Chief of 
Army (CoA) and Dpt. Chief Marital Law Administrator (1975–1977), 
and later both President and CoA (1977–1982), Zia established the 
paramilitary force Bangladesh Ansars, the Village Defense Parties, a 
Settler Program, a supporting Special Settlement Zone Program, and 
the Chittagong Tracts Development Board. The army, police, and 
paramilitary operated under an executive mandate to conduct both 
rough military operations and civil-humanitarian operations. Later 
elected governments have never abolished this blurred civil-military 
dispensation, in spite of the CHT Accord’s provisions to the contrary. 
Arguably, the civil-military complex was institutionalized under 
General Zia. By playing the tainted internal and external enemy 
card,51 the military regime succeeded in building political legitimacy. 
The rhetoric was perfectly suited to BNP’s territorial Muslim-
centered propaganda. The regime secured substantial finances for 
the complex’s build-up. In spite of weak democratic credentials and 
few peace initiatives in CHT, the Zia regime attracted more foreign 
aid than any other since Independence. It disposed aid to indirectly 
subsidize increased annual defense budgets, sanctioned without prior 
transparent executive or legislative debates. The developmental CHT 
policy was a strategic ploy largely to secure foreign funding for diverse 
purposes. In reality, the new infrastructure greatly facilitated military 
and police operations in what used to be a rugged, road-less terrain. 
Patronage networks appropriated development funds through a range 
of inventive arrangements, providing generous kickbacks to national 
and regional civil-military personnel and government contractors.52 
51. The CHT conflict has been creatively used as a “trump card.” When played out, 
it would win the “game,” removing any doubt about the existence of a threat of 
unruly hill subjects and foreign interference. 
52. Mey, supra note 14, at 148.
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In double executive positions as both President and Chief of 
Army, Zia provided the fractional army patronage, expanded it and 
modernized it. The authorities galvanized public fears and a sense of 
patriotism by claiming the CHT guerilla represented a genuine threat to 
state sovereignty. Still, it took more than the effective use of nationalist 
propaganda in the government-controlled media to fully restore 
the army’s tarnished image. A new recruitment policy was actively 
used to strengthen the Armed Forces’ appeal. During the Pakistani 
Independence struggle, the officer corps was mainly composed of 
recruits from the landed Bengali elite.53 Zia and Ershad pushed for a 
more inclusive recruitment policy partly motivated by strategic state-
building concerns, and partly as a response to the elite’s declining 
interest in military careers. Improved access was notably confined to 
recruits of ethnic Bengali of urban and rural middle-class background.54 
The military rulers combined dictatorship with party building. Zia 
and Ershad respectively built the BNP and the Jatiya Party through 
state patronage, exploiting factionalism within the already established 
parties.55 Arguably, this was nothing new. The Awami League, 
under Sheikh Mujib’s leadership, resorted to similar techniques of 
governance while his military successors prohibited other mass-
based parties at times in order to expand their own membership 
bases and to some degree contain popular protests and demands for 
genuine electoral and parliamentary democracy. Instead, Zia and 
Ershad organized and controlled unfair elections in order to cling to 
power. Consolidating power through combined rule and reign, they 
learned the political and administrative craft of civilizing their largely 
authoritarian regimes, thereby consolidating popular support. They 
built Sarkar party apparatus that established crosscutting ties with 
civilian-military institutions, or operated within them, extracting vast 
public resources. The civilian and military apparatus ultimately failed 
53. Supra note 50.
54. Zaman and Biswas, supra note 46, at 336. This author (Bleie, supra note 24) studied 
barriers to Adivasi youth employment opportunities in the years 1982–1998 and 
found that a military career was virtually closed off due to discrimination against 
the Adivasi. 
55. Rounaq Jahan, Political Parties in Bangladesh, CPI-CMI Working Paper Series 
(Bergen, Norway: Center for Policy Dialogue and Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2014). 
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to contain the build-up of a student-led mass movement demanding 
full civil and political rights. The level and severity of police and army 
violence, mass arrests, torture, extra-judicial killings and massacres 
in CHT were raised repeatedly by Dhaka’s numerous diplomatic 
corps and a range of international human rights and good governance 
constituencies. however, the international community mostly stopped 
short of a robust policy of sanctions underpinned by tangible “sticks 
and carrots.” They chose to rely on shaming, pressuring for state 
accountability through the UN’s human rights mechanisms and 
funding massive good-governance initiatives. 
The BNP-led government had limited ideological, normative, or 
pecuniary interest in the early 1990s in ending the low-intensity war 
with PCJSS. Importantly, PCJJS decision to withdraw their long-
time demand for extensive self-rule, paved the ground for new peace 
negotiations. BNP was built by a former military dictator and was 
firmly embedded within the civil-military complex. Awami League, 
the main opposition party, went to the polls with a peace accord 
pledge, but in government it was trapped in an entrenched patron-
client network involving politicians, civilians, military bureaucrats, 
and business people. Three AL-led governments have dragged 
their feet in implementing the most consequential provisions of the 
Accord. The oft-repeated recourse to caretaker government represents, 
undoubtedly, an incremental change in civil-military relations after a 
fairly free electoral democracy was instituted in 1991. In the polarized 
political climate, the caretaker mechanism allowed for a number of 
largely free and fair elections. Several analysts have understood it 
as a mediating civil-military mechanism, which goes a long way in 
explaining why no full-fledged military coup has occurred since 1990. 
This caretaker dispensation functioned as a mediatory power-
sharing safety valve, but not simply by keeping the mighty army “in 
the barracks” and avoiding political intervention as coup makers. 
Intriguingly, quite a sizable proportion of the standing army has for 
decades not been in the barracks, but on operative duty abroad for 
the UN and in the “securitized” CHT. The army operates in CHT as 
administrator and as force from a large number of main and satellite 
cantonments and camps. It can be maintained that it is this axis of 
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both transnational deployment and internal occupation of CHT that 
defines the parameters for negotiated space between the main political 
parties with their patrimonial leaders (in position and opposition) 
and a range of militarily vested actors. The militarily vested actors 
are widely distributed across institutions having the formal trappings 
of civil or military institutions, and in mandated hybrid institutions. 
Such vested actors also operate in elusive crosscutting vertical and 
horizontal kinship and friendship networks. They tend to be mobilized 
for specific illegal, quasi-legal, or legal purposes. 
In this chapter, the term rule refers to the conduct of successive 
elected governments and interim caretaker governments. The verb 
reign (as distinct from the noun) is retained for the deep state or state-
affiliated actors who actually dominate and control from behind. For 
nearly two decades of Bangladesh’s 55-year history, formal rulers 
became governments by military takeover. They actually combined 
their rule with reign. Given the country’s highly political polity, 
they were compelled to experiment with rule through new Sarkar 
(government) parties. When these parties attained a certain level of 
support, they assumed the trappings of regular parties with a popular 
electoral basis. Both the BNP and Jatio had quite broad voter appeal, but 
voter loyalty fluctuated considerably. The parties were and are highly 
centralistic with weak permanent local party bases.56 The AL-alliance-
led decision under Sheikh hasina to abolish the caretaker dispensation 
in the Constitution may be an ominous sign of a more permanent 
power-sharing arrangement with the military. Alternatively, it may 
be a barometer showing the rise of an overconfident authoritarian 
leadership, echoing the late Sheik Mujiib’s turn to a one-party system. 
If so, have we come full circle? In other words, will the army again 
become openly interventionistic? 
c)  Peacekeeping as political asset and Achilles heel
This article will now return to Bangladesh’s troop contributions to 
UN Peacekeeping, a key element in their current civil-military relations 
and the opaque power-sharing arrangements that was analyzed above. 
56. Rounaq, supra note 55. 
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Firstly, the timing of the entry of Bangladesh into UN Peacekeeping 
operations was likely not accidental. In the late 1980s, General Ershad 
had prioritized public investment in army expansion. This was the decade 
when the most profiled national duty of the army, paramilitaries and 
police was to combat the insurgency in the CHT. Was the timing of the 
decision to start deploying troops to UN operations purely coincidental? 
While there is no hard evidence to prove this, it is nevertheless quite 
plausible that the aid-bloated military regime realized it needed to 
improve its own and the army’s tarnished image, a result of breaches 
of international law in operations and treatment of civilian populations. 
The Ershad government first sent a group of military observers as part 
of the Iran-Iraq Military Observation Group. The subsequent civilian 
government (from 1991) expanded the number of peacekeepers. Over 
the last fifteen years, Bangladesh has become a main source of personnel 
to UN Peacekeeping missions. Between 2000 and 2013, Bangladesh 
provided nearly 120,000 personnel from the Armed Forces and the 
police.57 This quite massive presence of Bangladeshi blue helmets 
has improved the country’s reputation internationally, especially since 
there is hardly adequate coverage and international awareness of the 
military’s atrocities and rampant impunity in the CHT.58 
A recent case demonstrates interesting implications for domestic 
politics (including CHT) and civil-military relations. In 2006, the 
country prepared its ninth parliamentary elections in a tense political 
atmosphere marked by escalating violence and a partial paralysis of 
public and private sector functions. I commented above that when the 
caretaker government took over in early 2007, this was largely welcomed 
by citizens and the international community. This community had a 
sizable diplomatic multilateral and bilateral representation in Dhaka. 
Although all facets of the main actors’ motives behind the military 
facilitated takeover are not fully known, there is sufficient information 
to undertake a useful analysis.
57. Zaman and Bishwas, supra note 46, at 327.
58. Muhammed A. Islam, “Peacekeeping Operations and its Legal Implications,” 
Bangladesh Army Journal (January 2001): 50–58. See several Press Statements 
by the CHTC between 2011–2016 on matters of impunity by army and police: 
http://www.chtcommission.org/page.php?idn=19
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It is known that the diverse donor community largely supported 
Renata Dassallien’s stance. As UNDP’s erstwhile Resident 
Coordinator, she played an influential backstage role in pressuring for 
a caretaker government. Dassallien made it completely clear that if the 
army “allowed” the contested election to take place (with prospects 
of endless street politics by the main opposition parties), Bangladesh 
would risk its highly valued access to the UN Peacekeeping forces. 
There is evidence that Dassallien’s rather unveiled threat of diplomatic 
sanctions was one of the decisive factors motivating the key military 
and political actors of the agitating parties to enter into a compromise 
and opt for the “interim” solution.59 This is an illustrative case of how 
multilateral actors, through a resident coordinator (and with overt or 
tacit nods from several other diplomatic missions) could effectively 
mobilize and exercise diplomatic pressure, in this case Bangladesh’s 
incorporation into a norm-based international community, from which 
substantial financial benefits could also be reaped. These benefits flow 
not only to a large number of troops, but also to the government via the 
Ministry of Defense. These substantial annual incomes have made it 
possible to purchase new equipment and, to some degree, to subsidize 
the army.60 Importantly, the scope of acceptable political alternatives 
did preclude a coup, which would have radically questioned the army’s 
democratic credentials and standing as a peacekeeping operator. What 
was at stake were numerous social and financial assets, which Zaman 
and Biswas61 quite aptly have termed prestige, economic assets, and 
political and institutional rationales. And what was at stake financially, 
one might add, was not only big money for the state coffers. Arguably, 
the hierarchical army and the civil bureaucracy are entrenched 
patronage systems, within which many benefit from corruption and 
rent seeking, starting from troop nominations/selections and ending 
when troops receive their final reimbursement having returned from 
these missions. The UN’s Resident Coordinator in this case acted 
59. There was a Press Statement of the UN Resident Coordinator (of 11/1/2007) 
that expressed this in fairly explicit language. See also “Restoring Democracy in 
Bangladesh: Asia Report No. 151,” International Crisis Group (2008).
60. Islam, supra note 58; Zaman and Biswas, supra note 46.
61. Zaman and Biswas, supra note 46, at 330.
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robustly (behind the scenes), bargaining with a precious political 
and financial asset for Bangladesh’s civil-military elite. In terms of 
political outcome, this was (at that particular time) rather successful 
diplomacy. Dassallien, acting on behalf of the UN, nevertheless paid 
a price for these rather unusual realist politics. After this episode, both 
prominent members of the civil-military elite and several prominent 
Bengali and English daily newspapers called for Dassallien to be 
treated as persona non grata for the rest of her tenure in Bangladesh.62 
III. Conclusion: From a normative straight jacket to 
descriptive models 
Media and the development industry have in recent decades 
characterized Bangladesh as a conundrum or paradox. Arguably, 
when analysts apply the term “paradox,” it is often a façade hiding 
a lack of understanding of underlying structural causes. Portrayals of 
Bangladesh as both an extraordinary success story and a pariah state 
in terms of “good governance” warrant better answers than analysts 
have offered so far. Explanatory efforts too often end up as muddled 
exercises that highlight impressive results and the thriving NGO sector 
as a prime enabler and deliverer of goods and services compensating 
for a “weak” state. Within these grander incoherent narratives, human 
rights violations and the stranded 1997 Peace Accord are relegated the 
status of lower order issues or problems. One reads maps of Bangladesh 
as bounded sovereign territory, interpreting CHT’s post-independence 
geographical location as an outer-lying border region. What is the 
result if such map reading is combined with scant knowledge of 
CHT’s past as a bridge between the hills, plains and coasts and two 
cultural regions, of its rich exploitable resources and toxic potency 
in nationalist discourses? The result is a gross underestimation of 
the importance of this particular conflict between state sovereignty 
62. The author thanks a former Scandinavian diplomat to Bangladesh for valuable 
insights into diplomacy‘s front and backstage activities in Dhaka during this particular 
period. The author would like to acknowledge insightful and critical comments 
from Elsa Stamatopoulou, Desmond Molloy, Syed Muhammad Ibrahim, Syed 
Mahmud Ali, Dev Raj Dahal, Ann-Lisbet Arn, Sontosh Tripura, Selja Vassnes and 
two anonymous reviewers.  
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and peoples’ sovereignty. The latter anchored in the 1900 Manual, a 
compromise of sorts between the British authorities and militant hill 
peoples defying an imposed status as colonial subjects. 
This piece has called for a less restrictive and exclusively normative 
theory and analysis in favor of an interdisciplinary approach, which 
accords greater weight to descriptive models of constitutional 
cultures, the nature of patronage-based factionalist politics and a 
largely homegrown civil-military complex. To end, this paper will 
present a conclusive observation on the merits of descriptive analysis 
of evidence of individual and collective action; their moral, emotional, 
and socio-economic underpinnings; and the scope such insights may 
provide for effective diplomacy and advocacy. But first of all, some 
conclusive comments, framed by this argument. 
As I sought to highlight in this chapter, CHT’s post-Raj political 
history of shifting allegiances, resistance movements and negotiated 
compromises, not forgetting CHT as a hotspot for armed actors, has 
to be factored in when explaining CHT as a site of competing ethno-
nationalistic ideologies, geopolitics and resource wars. These factors, 
together with the exclusionary traits of Bengali and Bangladeshi 
nationalist narratives, makes it easier to comprehend why the demands 
for constitutional recognition and a return to the 1900 Manual have been 
vehemently rejected. This constitutes part of quite a complex series of 
arguments about patrimonial politics in Bangladesh, which I sought 
to develop in this chapter. Arguably, Bengali pride and grievances 
were effectively mobilized to legitimize the army’s buildup after 
Bangabhandu’s assassination. Continuity rather than abrupt change 
characterizes Zia’s and Ershad’s authoritarian patrimonial reign and 
rule, following the late Mujib’s rule of declared state of emergency and 
a one-party state. Arguably, a civil-military complex formed, indirectly 
co-financed by international development assistance, which “bought” 
successive military governments (1975–1990) and the so-called CHT 
Development Board Initiative. Influential donors either underestimated 
or chose to overlook how development in CHT enabled militarization 
and politically engineered in-migration, spurred internal strife, social 
differentiation and provided lucrative opportunities for rent-seeking, 
corruption and territorially-based land occupations. 
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The politics of military occupation and land grabbing were pursued 
and were countered by a range of inventive modes of armed and 
peaceful resistance nationally. The Jumma ethno-political project was 
also lifted into the international arena. A new generation of able Jumma 
leaders, including heirs to semi-traditional offices of the Chakma and 
Tripura, did more than appropriating an expanding human rights regime. 
They actively contributed to the codification of Indigenous rights and 
advocated for these rights globally and regionally. It is the conversion 
of this normative regime back into Bangladeshi national constitutional 
politics and laws which has proved difficult. The underlying complex 
reasons for the conversion barrier have been highlighted above. Since 
shaming and the regular human rights accountability mechanisms have 
so far proved relatively ineffective, leading human rights actors have in 
recent years recalibrated their multipronged approach. That includes, 
for example, measurable milestones for the Accord’s incomplete or 
unimplemented clauses and advocating for routine screening of applicants 
from Bangladesh army and police to UN Peacekeeping operations. 
Informed by more recent approaches to the study of civil-military 
relations, this chapter has examined why the CHT Accord is likely 
to remain largely “a dead letter.” There is nothing sensational about 
this finding, and least so among Bangladeshi human rights defenders, 
national and local CHT politicians, bureaucrats and security personnel. 
The question is rather, who is gaining and who is losing as a result 
of the current politics of pretense? It would require another essay to 
address this tangled and highly sensitive question with the nuances 
and rigor it deserves. For international human rights bodies, like the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission (CHTC), to officially announce 
the Accord-track a permanent failure, would not only remove the 
rationale for its current mandated existence. This could also be used by 
a range of state and non-state spoilers who would like to intensify the 
use of violent means in CHT. Foreign assistance currently constitutes 
considerably less of Bangladesh’s GDP than it did two decades ago. 
Yet CHT-dedicated constituencies remain partly integrated into the 
development industry and may, for a range of strategic, tactical and 
pecuniary reasons, find it too risky to announce the Accord dead and 
call for its eventual renegotiation. This chapter has analyzed major 
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shifts (most notably Bangladesh as a major troop-contributing country 
to UN Peacekeeping operations) and the major political parties’ 
noticeable accommodation within the civil-military nexus. 
A relatively recent signal of this subtle process of accommodation 
is the military’s apparent preference for the Bangladesh Awami League 
and Sheik hasina-led coalition and the League’s unilateral abolishment 
in 2011 of the caretaker government mechanism through a constitutional 
amendment. Such indications of consolidation of the deep state do 
not bode well for either consolidation of parliamentary democracy, 
reduction of political violence or genuine stakes in renegotiation of the 
CHT Accord on terms PCJSS may accept. Importantly, behind these 
two Accord signatories is a hazy landscape of potential “spoilers” 
including fractions within PCJSS, the anti-Accord umbrella organization 
UPDR and a range of other dissident hill groups and Bengali settler 
organizations. In this volatile and spoiler-rich national and regional 
context, the CHTC’s expanded scope lies in more extensive and synergic 
uses of both its national and international legs. 
The evocative title “Whose Ideas, Whose Interests” of an aid policy 
study on Bangladesh from the mid-1990s comes to mind. It is quite 
telling of the international community’s optimism after the alleged 
restoration of democracy and trust in its scope of influencing party 
and state politics, discriminatory ideas and ill-functioning public and 
private institutions.63 The title nevertheless also conveys a warning: if 
these are our ideas, they might serve certain interests at the expense of 
others. The whole policy of trying to impose good governance in order 
to transform patrimonial factionalist practices and institutional culture 
into neutral decision-making, servicing and financial institutions, was 
ill-conceived and unrealistic in the first place. Western norm-driven 
63. Geoffrey D. Wood, Whose ideas, Whose interests? (London: Intermediate 
Technology Publication, 1984); Stanley A. Kochanek, “Patronage Politics, and 
Democratization Transition in Bangladesh,” Asian Survey 40, no. 3 (2000): 
530–550; David Lewis, Bangladesh Politics, Economy and the Civil Society, 
(Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Mohammad M. 
Islam, “The Toxic Politics of Bangladesh: A Bipolar Competitive Neopatrimonial 
State?” Asian Journal of Political Science 21, no. 2 (2013): 148–168; Bert 
Suykens, Segmentary Opposition: Vertical Integration of the Structure of Political 
Relations in Bangladesh: A Descriptive Model, (Ghent University, Belgium: 
Conflict Research Group, 2016).
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theories and policies have only to a limited degree been confronted 
with, and combined with, descriptive models of dominating and 
emerging collective and individual interests and behaviors in 
Bangladesh. Strategic alliances and interests can be successfully 
pursued if the negotiation space for bargaining or pressure is used 
wisely. The peacekeeping case is illustrative of “stick and carrot” 
diplomacy around a critical asset to be used sparingly. The asset at 
stake was Bangladesh’s incorporation in a norm-based international 
community, from which also substantial financial benefits could be 
reaped. Since this event in 2007, the relative importance of foreign 
assistance as a proportion of GDP has declined further. And notably, the 
Government of Bangladesh remains unwilling to be incorporated into 
the international norm-based community on Indigenous rights. This 
contrasts starkly with its continued commitment to UN Peacekeeping 
and sustaining the progress it has made in fulfilling social and 
economic rights. For CHT-focused human rights defenders, these 
current conversion barriers should not be seen as insurmountable. 
